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Abstract
We consider secrecy and authentication in a simple process calculus with cryptographic primitives.
The standard Dolev–Yao adversary is enhanced so that it can guess the key required to decrypt an
intercepted message. We borrow from the computational complexity approach the assumptions that
guessing succeeds with a given negligible probability and that the resources available to adversaries
are polynomially bounded. Under these hypotheses we prove that the standard Dolev–Yao adversary
is as powerful as the enhanced one.
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1. Introduction
A lot of recent work concerns the analysis of security protocols. While the problem has
been approached in many different ways, the techniques used can be classiﬁed into two
main classes. On the one side, we have results coming from computational complexity
theory which offers a detailed, in-depth view of cryptosystems and protocols and deals
with probability and algorithms. On the other side, formal methods provide abstractions
that allow for mechanical proofs of cryptographic protocol properties, but often require
stronger assumptions, among which is the perfect or unbreakable encryption assumption.
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Often, formal methods work on protocols speciﬁed in some process calculi and assume
the existence of the so-called Dolev–Yao adversary (DY for short). Besides fully controlling
the network, it manipulates messages but it cannot break encryptions. We study here ways
to weaken the perfect encryption property, taking care of some computational aspects.
We use a process calculus to model key-exchange protocols and we enhance the standard
DY adversary by explicitly allowing it to break encryptions through a guessing operation.
We call the enhanced adversary DYP. Roughly speaking, once intercepted a message, the
adversary can deduce the key to decrypt it with a given probability.
Computational reasoning predicts that guessing is hard, provided that
• the cryptosystem is robust,
• the adversary has only a reasonably bounded computational power (e.g., the adversary
is in probabilistic polynomial time, PP-Time), and
• the keys are long enough.
Many other factors affect the probability of guessing, but for the sake of simplicity, of-
ten one considers only those above. Also, the computational approach leaves the actual
probability distribution implicit. So the proof that a protocol is secure considers a suitable
class of probability distributions, rather than a speciﬁc one. Here, we shall make the same
assumptions.
We compare the traditional Dolev–Yao model in which guessing is not permitted against
our enhanced one. The comparison is made easy by the fact that, if we forbid the use of
the guessing operation, the DYP model collapses onto DY. Moreover, since we only deal
with discrete probability distributions, removing the guessing operation is equivalent to
assuming the guessing probability to be null everywhere.
Our study is carried on two security notions: secrecy and authentication. We give two
deﬁnitions of secrecy for a protocol.Both are given inSection 4 and consider only the secrecy
of a selected piece of data. One deﬁnition is the traditional one and it can be summarized as
follows: the adversary cannot learn a given secret by interacting with the protocol and by
constructing/destructing the intercepted data with the only limitation that encryptions are
unbreakable. The other deﬁnition, instead, is adapted from the computational complexity
approach. Roughly, the probability of learning a certain secret is a function of the key length,
assuming the adversary is in PP-Time and breaking the cryptosystem is a problem not in
PP-Time. Then, one studies the asymptotic behaviour of this function. Obviously, our ﬁrst
secrecy deﬁnition is based on the DY model, and our second one is designed for the DYP
model.
Similarly, we give two deﬁnitions of authentication for a protocol in Section 5. The
ﬁrst one is a formal deﬁnition adapted from [23]. This property requires that a responder
successfully completes a run only if an initiator started it. The other notion is its DYP
counterpart: the probability the adversary has to disrupt authentication is represented as a
function of the key length. Again, we then study its asymptotic behaviour.
Our main result shows that, for both secrecy (Section 4) and authentication (Section 5),
the two security models DY and DYP are equivalent. On the one hand, this result is not
surprising: increasing the length of the keys and still keeping the adversary polynomially
bounded (with respect to the key length) results in a virtually perfect encryption.On the other
hand, the traditionalDYmodel is considerably simpler and has an accuracy comparablewith
that of the DYP model, under the standard hypothesis that guessing is hard.
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For the sake of presentation, here we consider a core calculus, with the essential features,
only. Sometimes, we make some assumptions to keep our model as simple as possible, even
if they are not strictly needed and could be relaxed (see e.g. Section 6). More advanced
primitives can be easily added along the lines discussed in Section 7. In the same section,
we also sketch some further possible extensions to our DYP model.
Related work. Several authors recently started to ﬁll the abstraction gap between the
computational approach and the formal methods approach to the analysis of cryptographic
protocols. Abadi and Rogaway [4] propose an equivalence on terms of a formal language
that reﬂects the computational notion of indistinguishability of the bit-strings representing
the terms. A ﬁner equivalence is proposed by Troina et al. in [25]. Abadi and Jürjens [3]
extend the equivalence of [4] to a process calculus and study indistinguishability in the
presence of a passive adversary. Micciancio andWarinschi further extend the equivalences
of [4] and [3] by considering a broader class of cryptosystems; their logic is complete: two
terms are equivalent if and only if their corresponding bit-strings are indistinguishable.
Our proposal differs from the above in that we assume a full active DY adversary. Also,
we extend the adversary model with a computationally-oriented feature, instead of giving
(to parts of) it a computational account.
Our approach is similar to that of Mitchell et al. [22] who use a probabilistic calculus and
an equivalence based on probabilistic bisimulation.This equivalence is then used to establish
indistinguishability of process behaviour, under common cryptographic assumptions.
Herzog in [14] shows that sufﬁciently strong crptography can limit a computational
adversary, to make it as powerful as the DY formal adversary.
Pﬁtzmann and Backes [5,6] compare the computational adversary and the formal one
exploiting the notion of simulatability. The protocol principals are modelled as Turing
machines and all the cryptographic operations are performed by an oracle which is used
as a cryptographic library. The oracle implements the library operations by manipulating
either terms or bit-strings, offering the same interface to principals. Therefore, the oracle
can interact with a computational or with a formal adversary. Simulatability ensures that
every computational attack can be simulated formally, thus proving the connection between
the two adversary models.
Coming from a formal side, we use a process algebra to specify protocols and exist-
ing techniques to analyze them, while [6,5] pay more attention to computationally-based
descriptions of the principals and of the cryptosystem.
Finally, we mention a paper by Lowe [17] that studies intruders who can guess secrets.
The focus of his paper, quite different from ours, is on the feasibility of verifying whether
the guess succeeded.
2. A simple process calculus: syntax
We introduce a simple process calculus thatwe use tomodel key-exchange protocols.This
calculus is basically a variant of the -calculus [19] enriched with cryptographic primitives,
much alike the Spi-calculus [2]. Since we want to keep our calculus as simple as possible,
we only use symmetric encryption. A brief account of asymmetric encryption is given in
Section 7.
R. Zunino, P. Degano / Theoretical Computer Science 340 (2005) 154–178 157
Let N be a denumerable set of names and let V be a denumerable set of variables. We
use the letters n,m, o to range over N and the letters x, y, z to range over V . Under these
assumptions, we deﬁne terms in the following way. Terms represent the messages that are
sent over the network when the protocol is run. Their meaning is standard.
L,M,N ::= 0 | 1 bit
| x variable
| n name
| (M,N) pair
| {M}N symmetric encryption
We now deﬁne processes in the following way:
P,Q,R ::= nil null process
| (x).P input
| 〈M〉.P output
| (P |Q) composition
| ! P replication
| (new n)P declaration
| ifM = N then P elseQ conditional
| splitM as (x, y) in P split
| decryptM as {x}N in P symmetric decryption
The above syntax is quite standard, and readers familiar with other process calculi will ﬁnd
it straightforward. A simple intuitive description follows.
The nil process does not perform any operation. The input process (x).P reads a value
from the network, assigns it to the variable x and then behaves as P. The output process
〈M〉.P sends a value over the network and then behaves as P. The parallel composition of
two processes is denoted by (P | Q); P and Q can evolve independently. The replication
! P behaves as the parallel composition of an unlimited number of P processes. We write
(new n)P for the creation of new names (i.e., new keys, fresh nonces, etc.). The condi-
tional tests whether two terms are equal. Split and decryption are used to destruct pair and
encryption terms. Note that the decryption requires the (secret) key to succeed.
The most important features of this calculus are the following:
• All the input and output operations use the same global public channel, unlike some
other calculi such as the -calculus or the Spi-calculus, where input and output occur
on given channels.
While this makes it impossible, for instance, to specify the destination for a message
(which is very inconvenient from a programmer’s point of view), it models the standard
Dolev–Yao assumption which states that the adversary is able to reroute messages. In
a sense, the global channel acts as a black-board on/from which processes write/read
messages.
• There are no private channels in our calculus. Although private channels could be used
to model secure links, we do not include them in our calculus in order to keep it simple.
A variable is said to be bound if it occurs under an input preﬁx, split, or decryption;
otherwise it is said to be free. Similarly, a name is bound if it occurs under a declaration
(new n), otherwise it is free. We write fv(P ), bv(P ), fn(P ), bn(P ) respectively for (the
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sets of) the free variables, the bound variables, the free names, and the bound names of the
process P.
3. A simple process calculus: semantics
We deﬁne an adversary-aware semantics of our process calculus. This means that our se-
mantics explicitly assumes the presence of an adversary andmodels the interaction between
it and the system which executes a certain protocol (i.e., a process P).
We ﬁrst make two assumptions about what the adversary can or cannot do:
• Like the Dolev–Yao adversary, ours can intercept and learn messages as they are sent
over the network. The adversary can then send over the network terms built from the
knownmessages byusing the followingoperations: pairing, splitting of pairs, encryption,
and decryption. This also implies the adversary is able to reroute, discard, and replace
messages, possibly pretending that they are from someone else.
• Unlike the Dolev–Yao adversary, ours can also guess a key which has been used to
encrypt some message. This special operation, however, only succeeds with a given
probability.
3.1. The adversary
We introduce the following entailment rules, that deﬁne the operations of the adversary.
As usual, each rule can be read as: “the adversary can build the term of the right-hand side
of the arrow provided it knows the terms on the left-hand side”.
DYCons M,N
1−→DY (M,N)
DYFst (M,N)
1−→DY M
DYSnd (M,N)
1−→DY N
DYEnc M,n
1−→DY {M}n
DYDec {M}n, n 1−→DY M
DYGuess {M}n p−→DY n
Each arrow has a label, expressing the probability of the operation to succeed. The ﬁrst ﬁve
rules are the traditional Dolev–Yao rules and get probability 1 as they never fail. Instead,
rule DYGuess allows the adversary to guess the secret key n with probability p. We shall
discuss afterwards why here keys are names, only. Note that rule DYGuess extends the
Dolev–Yao model of adversary.
As anticipated in the Introduction, we shall not assign speciﬁc values to the success prob-
ability p for DYGuess, just as it happens within the computational complexity approach.
Indeed, the guessing probability depends on many factors, such as which cryptosystem was
used for the encryption, the length of the key used, whether the adversary knows other mes-
sages encrypted with the same key, whether the adversary knows the plaintext, the amount
of computational resources (i.e., time) spent by the adversary, and so on. Even if all these
factors are taken into account, there is no handy formula for the guessing probability. In
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order to keep our system simple, we make some further assumptions:
• We constrain encryptions to use only names as keys: all the encryptions thus must have
the form {M}n. This can be enforced by a simple type system. Furthermore, we assume
that names are encoded as bit strings of the same length . 1
• We assume that the guessing probability depends only on  and on the number of opera-
tions T previously performed by the adversary: wewrite it asPguess(, T ). In particular,
it does not depend on the result (success or failure) of previous DYGuess operations.
Most importantly, here we stipulate that the adversary consumes one unit of computa-
tional resources in order to perform the guess (this last assumption is not crucial: see
Section 7).
Intuitively, the probability Pguess(, T ) decreases as soon as longer keys are used, i.e., as
 increases. Similarly, when the adversary performs some operation, it might learn some
information that can help it to guess a key afterwards. This means that the probability
Pguess(, T ) increases as soon as T increases. The way Pguess depends on  and T is
related to the strength of the cryptosystem.
As discussed in the related work, in the computational complexity approach there are
different ways to regard a cryptosystem as robust. In all of them, it turns out that the func-
tionPguess “quickly” approaches zero as soon as  increases, provided that T is reasonably
bounded (see Deﬁnition 3). Somehow arbitrarily, we shall only require this kind of asymp-
totic assumption on Pguess in Sections 4 and 5, pretending that the longer the keys, the
stronger the encryptions. As a matter of fact, our assumption on Pguess is not sufﬁcient
to imply robustness in a computational sense, yet natural and convenient in our formal
framework. We shall come back on this issue in Section 7, where we shall also consider an
alternative view: guessing the contents of encryptions without breaking keys.
We do not put further assumptions on Pguess(, T ). In particular, we take in no account
the properties a cryptosystem must have to ensure that Pguess satisﬁes the requirement
above. Instead, we shall consider Pguess a free parameter, and we shall prove our results
for a suitable class of probability functions.
3.2. The transition system
In order to deﬁne the semantics of our calculus, we use a labeled transition system (LTS).
Its states are composed of:
• the adversary’s knowledge K, which represents the set of terms that the adversary has
learnt or built so far;
• the number of operations T the adversary performed during the previous steps of the
computation;
• a process P, which represents the current state of the execution of the protocol;
• an optional pair (p,N), used to model the fact that the adversary is about to learn the
term N with probability p.
We write (K, T , P ) (or, if the optional part is present, (K, T , P )p,N ) to represent a generic
state of the LTS.
1 In the computational complexity approach  is the security parameter that affects the length of keys. For the
sake of simplicity, here we simply identify it with the key length.
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We now give the intuition underlying our transitions. A ﬁrst kind of transition models a
“standard” action of a process P:
(K, T , P ) −→(K′, T , P ′).
Initially, the adversary has knowledge K. Then, P performs an action and becomes P ′. If
the action is the output of a message M, the new knowledge is K′ = K ∪ {M}, otherwise
K′ = K.
Another kind of transition models an action of the adversary:
(K, T , P ) ♠−→(K, T , P )p,N .
This transition represents the choice of some operation op the adversary is going to apply
to the terms it knows. The superscript p is the probability to get the result N (p = 1 only
when the operation is a guess). From the target state of a ♠−→ transition, two transitions exit.
One transition represents the success of operation op and has the form
(K, T , P )p,N ♠s−→
p
(K ∪ {N}, T + 1, P ).
The other transition instead represents the failure of op:
(K, T , P )p,N ♠f−→
1−p (K, T + 1, P ).
Both these transitions are labeled with the corresponding probability and increase the num-
ber T of operations performed by the adversary.
Before giving the deﬁnitions of the transitions −→, ♠−→ and ♠s/f−→ , we make some as-
sumptions in order to simplify the deﬁnition of our system. To this purpose, we consider
processes up to the structural congruence relation ≡, deﬁned as the minimum congruence
on the set of processesP including -conversion (renaming of bound names), and such that
(P/≡, |, nil) is an abelian monoid.
While on the one hand this allows for a simpler semantics, on the other hand this makes
it harder to express properties on processes. For example, consider the following processes
R1 = (new n )P | (new m)Q,
R2 = (new m)P {m/n} | (new n )Q{n/m},
where, as usual, {m/n} denotes substitution. The above processes are equivalent according
to≡. Suppose that wewant to state “R1 never performs the output of n”, meaning that (some
instance of) the name n that occurs in (new n)P is never sent through the network. In order
to formalize this property, we need to cope with the fact that -conversion can perform any
arbitrary renaming, e.g., transforming R1 into R2, thus causing confusion among names.
This may lead to quite a complex formalization.
We want to avoid this kind of confusion. To this aim, we partition the set of names N
into equivalence classes, and we assume that the -conversion of a name is only performed
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within its equivalence class.Wewrite n ∼ mwhen n andm belong to the same equivalence
class. We also extend homomorphically the relation ∼ to terms.
We still assume processes up to≡, where we use the just introduced -conversion, rather
than the usual one, to avoid confusion. For example, provided that n ∼ m in the example
above, R1 cannot be renamed into R2 and thus R1 ≡ R2. In general, we shall require ∼ to
hold for all the names in a process that we want to keep distinct. This requirement can be
formally stated as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A process P is canonical iff
• ∀n,m. n and m occur in different declarations in P ⇒ n ∼ m.
• ∀n,m ∈ fn(P ) ∪ bn(P ). n = m⇒ n ∼ m.
If a process P is canonical, we can simply state properties referring to names that occur
in P (up to ∼). In the above example, assuming R1 is canonical, we can state “R1 never
performs the output of n” as “whenever R1 outputs a termM, thenM ∼ n”. Note that this
statement precisely reﬂects the intended meaning of the property.
We will study secrecy (Section 4) and authentication (Section 5) only for canonical
processes, as this allows a simpler formalization of those properties.
Process actions ( −→). We now give the rules for −→, representing one action performed
by P. The transition label  can be either a name or a special symbol . We write P {M/x}
for the substitution of the term M at every free occurrence of x in P, possibly -converting
bound names if necessary.
In
M ∈ K
(K, T , (x).P ) −→(K, T , P {M/x})
,
Out
(K, T , 〈M〉.P ) −→(K ∪ {M}, T , P )
,
Decl
n does not occur in any term of K
(K, T , (new n)P ) n−→(K, T , P )
,
Rep
(K, T , ! P) −→(K, T , P | ! P)
,
Par
(K, T , P ) −→(K′, T , P ′)  =  ∨  /∈ fn(Q)
(K, T , P |Q) −→(K′, T , P ′|Q)
,
Then
(K, T , ifM = M then P elseQ) −→(K, T , P )
,
Else
M = N
(K, T , ifM = N then P elseQ) −→(K, T ,Q)
,
Dec
(K, T , decrypt {M}n as {x}n in P) −→(K, T , P {M/x})
,
Split
(K, T , split (M,N) as (x, y) in P) −→(K, T , P {M/x}{N/y})
.
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These rules are rather standard. The In rule requiresM ∈ K, thus modeling the adversary
sending a known term to the process. Rule Out instead makes the adversary learn the term
M. Rule Decl and Par ensure fresh names are generated each time a (new n) is executed.
Moreover, we note that if (K, T , P ) is closed (i.e., K only contains ground terms and P
has no free variables) all the states reachable from it are also closed. Additionally, in the
rules above the termsM and N are ground, provided that the source state is closed. Finally,
a canonical process may evolve to a non-canonical one through Rep:
(K, T , ! (new n)P ) −→(K, T , (new n′)P | ! (new n)P ).
This is indeed a wanted effect: if n has to be kept secret, so are to be all its instances n′
(with n ∼ n′); similarly when we study authentication.
Adversary actions. We can now deﬁne the ♠−→ and ♠s/f−→ transitions as follows:
♠Decision1 M ∈ K M
p−→DY N
(K, T , P ) ♠−→(K, T , P )p,N
,
♠Decision2 L,M ∈ K L,M
p−→DY N
(K, T , P ) ♠−→(K, T , P )p,N
,
♠Success
(K, T , P )p,N ♠s−→
p
(K ∪ {N}, T + 1, P )
,
♠Failure
(K, T , P )p,N ♠f−→
1−p (K, T + 1, P )
.
The ♠−→ transitions model the choice of:
• which entailment rule the adversary is going to apply, and
• which arguments it is applied to.
The target state records the term N the adversary is trying to obtain and the probability p
the adversary has to actually get it. When the adversary chooses a DYGuess operation,
the probability p is Pguess(, T ) where T is taken from the source state of the ♠−→ tran-
sition. Once the choice is performed, the ♠Success and ♠Failure rules model the actual
application of the entailment rule. In case of success, the term N is added to the adversary’s
knowledge. Note that the transition ♠s−→
p
(resp. ♠f−→
1−p ) records the success (resp. failure)
probability, inherited by the entailment rule applied. Finally, note that T is incremented by
either transitions of this kind.
4. Secrecy
Having established our adversary-aware semantics, we can evaluate the strength of a
given protocol. We ﬁrst focus on checking whether a protocol guarantees secrecy. This
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property can be easily expressed in our model because the states of our LTS explicitly
expose the knowledge K of the adversary. This allows us to check whether the adversary
knows a term M by simply checking whether M belongs in K. Since names in M can be
-converted, we actually check whether M ∼ N ∈ K for some N (we write M −K for
short).
We deﬁne the probability that, given an initial knowledge K, the adversary will learn a
given term M by interacting with a process P for a limited period. In order to accomplish
this, we put a bound t on the number of transitions of the computation at hand. This bound
limits the sum of
• the number of interactions between the adversary and the process P (i.e., of −→ transi-
tions), and
• the number of operations the adversary can perform (i.e., of ♠−→ ♠s/f−→ pairs of transitions).
We could instead use two different bounds for each kind of transition; however, this would
not affect the results we are going to present in this section. To keep our presentation as
concise as possible, we use thus the single parameter t.
We write  for the generic state (K, T , P ), and p,N for (K, T , P )p,N ; also, we write
the probability the adversary has to learn the term M as
S tM,,Pguess().
For brevity, we often omit the parameters  andPguess, insisting that they are free. In order to
deﬁne S tM(), we make the following assumptions. The ﬁrst is technical, while the second
one is typical of a “worst case” analysis.
•  is closed and K is nonempty (typically, K contains the bits 0, 1);
• among the transitions outgoing from a state and labeled by  or♠, we consider only the
one leading to the best state for the adversary. This is fairly standard in formal models: a
protocol is regarded as unsafe if some execution trace leads to the disclosure of a secret.
Deﬁnition 2. The probability S tM,,Pguess() is deﬁned by induction on t by the following
equations. 2
S tM() = 1 ifM −K, (1)
S 0M() = 0, (2)
S tM() = max
({
S t−1M (
′)
∣∣∣  −→′
}
∪
{
S tM(
p,N )
∣∣∣  ♠−→p,N
})
, (3)
S tM(
p,N ) =
∑{∣∣∣q ∗ S t−1M (′)
∣∣∣ p,N ♠s/f−→
q
′
∣∣∣
}
. (4)
Eq. (1) checks whether M was disclosed in a given  = (K, T , P ). Eq. (2) instead checks
whether M was not disclosed and time ran out (i.e., t = 0). Eq. (3) chooses the transition
which is the best for the adversary; the chosen transition may be a process action −→ or
an adversary action ♠−→ corresponding to some operation op. Eq. (4) considers both the
2We assume that, whenever two equations overlap, the topmost one applies.
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cases when the operation op succeeds
(
p,N
♠s−→
p
′
)
and fails
(
p,N
♠f−→
1−p 
′′
)
. Then, the
probability of discoveringM from p,N is the sum of the probability of discoveringM from
′ weighted by p, and from ′′, weighted by 1− p. Eq. (4) could also be written as
S tM(K, T , P )p,N=p · S t−1M (K ∪ {N}, T + 1, P )+ (1− p) · S t−1M (K, T +1, P ).
The right-hand sides of the equations in Deﬁnition 2 do not depend on the choice of names,
i.e., they are not affected by our constrained version of -conversion. Indeed, we use in (1)
the relation − that gets rid of -renaming; the other cases are trivial (case (2)) or follow
immediately by induction.Also, from any state, only ﬁnitelymany transitions −→ and ♠−→
exit (up to -conversion). Therefore, in (3),max is applied to a ﬁnite set.Moreover that set is
nonempty because there is always at least the ♠−→ transition corresponding to the DYCons
of some term belonging to the nonempty knowledge K. Thus S tM() is well-deﬁned.
4.1. A probabilistic secrecy notion
The probability S tM,,Pguess() measures the strength of a protocol P as a function of
the parameters t,K, T ,  and Pguess. We now aim for a deﬁnition of safe protocol which
abstracts from those parameters. We recall that a function is said to be negligible if it
approaches zero faster than any rational function. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3. We say that a function f : N→ R is negligible iff
∀k ∈ N ∃0 ∈ N ∀ ∈ N.  > 0 ⇒ |f ()| < −k.
For example, 2− is negligible, while −2 is not.
We regard a protocol as safe if, for any adversary with polynomially bounded resources
(with respect to the security parameter ), the probability of disclosing a secret (as a function
of ) is negligible, provided that the cryptosystem is strong, i.e., it can be broken only with
a negligible probability by such an adversary. This abstracts from the various notions of
protocol security found in the computational approach, e.g., [7,24,10], and does not imply
any of them. Our notion introduces only a few computational aspects, but it reﬁnes the
standard notions of security used in the formal method approach.
The probability functions that we use have two arguments and so we constrain them to
be negligible as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. We call a function Pguess(, T ) : N×N→ [0, 1] -negligible iff
1. ∀T , T ′, . T T ′ ⇒ Pguess(, T )Pguess(, T ′),
2. ∀c ∈ N. Pguess(, c) is negligible.
Requirement 1 simply says that Pguess is monotonic in its second argument. Requirement
2 imposes that the guessing probability is negligible when T is a polynomial in . This
condition expresses the robustness of the cryptosystem in the presence of an adversary that
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performed a polynomial number of operation in the previous steps of the computation in
hand.
We map the deﬁnition of safe protocol into our model. Again, we (polynomially) bound
the resources of the adversary, letting t = k . Finally, we assume that the adversary initially
knows only the terms 0 and 1. Accordingly to these assumptions, and recalling that P, the
speciﬁcation of the protocol, is canonical (see Deﬁnition 1), we write 0 for the initial state
({0, 1}, 0, P ). We can now deﬁne secrecy in the following way.
Deﬁnition 5. We say that a protocol P guarantees the DYP-secrecy of a given term M iff,
for any Pguess : N×N→ [0, 1],
Pguess is -negligible ⇒ ∀k ∈ N. S 
k
M,,Pguess
(0) is negligible.
The above deﬁnition can be read as:Pguarantees secrecy if, providedwe are using a strong
cryptosystem, any adversary with polynomially bounded resources has only negligible
probability of discoveringM. Note that, when Pguess is not null, bounding the resources of
the adversary (t = k) is crucial: for any protocol P which outputs a term whereM occurs,
we have
lim
t→∞ S
t
M,,Pguess(0) = 1.
Indeed, an unbounded adversary can repeatedly apply theDYGuess rule on any encryption
until it eventually succeeds.
Towards a comparison with standard secrecy. We compare the above deﬁnition of DYP-
secrecy with the standard notion of secrecy used in formal models (DYstd-secrecy), which
assumes a deterministic Dolev–Yao adversary.
Deﬁnition 6. We say that a protocol P guarantees the DYstd-secrecy of a term M iff
∀. 0−→∗ = (K, T , P ′)⇒ M −K,
where the arrow −→ stands for either a −→ transition or a pair ♠−→ ♠s−→ derived from a
deterministic Dolev–Yao rule (i.e., not using a DYGuess).
Note that this deﬁnition does not bound the number of transitions and therefore, unlike
Deﬁnition 5, is not resource-conscious.
It is convenient to rephrase the DYstd-secrecy property using S tM,,Pguess() in order
to simplify the comparison between Deﬁnitions 5 and 6. An obvious way of making the
DYGuess rule harmless is assuming a null guessing probability: this makes our model
deterministic.
Deﬁnition 7. LetP0 be the constant null function.We say that a protocol P guarantees the
DY-secrecy of a term M iff
∀t,  ∈ N. S tM,,P0(0) = 0.
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Proposition 1. For any , the probability S tM,,P0() is either 0 or 1.
Proof. Trivial induction. 
Moreover, it is easy to show by induction that Deﬁnitions 6 and 7 are indeed equivalent,
as the following proposition states:
Proposition 2. P guarantees DYstd-secrecy (of M) iff P guarantees DY-secrecy (of M).
Proof. Easy induction on t and the number of −→ transitions (see Deﬁnition 6). 
Proposition 2 enables us to compare DYP-secrecy against DYstd-secrecy by comparing
DYP-secrecy against DY-secrecy, as shown in the next section.
4.2. Comparing DY and DYP adversaries
The following lemma says that the probability an adversary has to break a protocol
increases with the power of the adversary, as expected.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity). If ∀, T ∈ N. Pg1(, T )Pg2(, T ) and t1 t2, then
∀ ∈ N ∀. S t1
M,,Pg1
()S t2
M,,Pg2
().
Proof. Easy induction on t. 
We introduce two preliminary lemmas that state simple analytic properties. Since their
proofs are trivial, we omit them.
Lemma 2. ∃x¯ > 0 ∀x. 0x < x¯ ⇒ 3−x1− x.
Lemma 3. For any c ∈ N, limx→∞ 1−3−x
−c−1
x−c = 0.
Our main result states the equivalence of DYP-secrecy and DY-secrecy.
Theorem 1. Pguarantees theDYP-secrecy ofM if and only if P guarantees theDY-secrecy
of M.
Proof. We rewrite the statement in the following way:
P does not guarantee DYP-secrecy ⇐⇒ P does not guarantee DY-secrecy.
(⇐) We have that, for some ε > 0, ∃t ∈ N. S tM,,P0(0) = ε. Therefore we can apply
the monotonicity lemma and state that, for every  > t , S 
M,,P0
(0)ε. This implies that
S

M,,P0
(0) is not negligible (as a function of ). Since P0 is -negligible, we conclude
that P does not guarantee the DYP-secrecy of M.
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(⇒) Intuitively, we examine the tree whose branches represent each possible execution of
P, considering that the operations of the adversary may or may not succeed. By hypothesis,
the probability the adversary has to discover M is non-negligible. This probability can be
expressed by a sum over all branches of the tree; however, we show that the probability
of discovering M summed over all branches that require at least one successful guess is
negligible. Therefore, the probability of the branch where every guessing attempt fails must
be non-negligible, and thus positive. This branch shows that a DY attack for P exists, so we
conclude that P does not guarantee DY-secrecy.
We now proceed with the proof. By hypothesis, for some k and some -negligiblePguess,
S
k
M,,Pguess
(0) is not negligible.
We now examine the deﬁnition of S tM,,Pguess(K, T , P ). Given t, M, , Pguess, K, T ,
and P, we can fully expand the deﬁnition to form a tree like the following one:
We name this tree T¯ . The tree T¯ is formed by internal nodes, which can be either max
nodes or weighted sum nodes, and leaf nodes, which can be either a constant 0 or a constant
1. The max nodes can have an arbitrary number of children (one for each −→ and ♠−→
transition). The weighted sum nodes have exactly two children, each with its weight (the
probability of succeeding or failing to apply a Dolev–Yao rule) as a label on the edge.
We denote the set of all root-to-leaf simple paths of T¯ with ¯. For every ¯ ∈ ¯ we
deﬁne a weight, by letting weight(¯) be the product of all the edge labels in the path; we
also deﬁne length(¯) as the length of the path and result(¯) as the value of the leaf at the
end of the path.
A simple inductive reasoning shows that the following properties hold:
∀¯ ∈ ¯. length(¯)2t, (5)
∀¯ ∈ ¯. S tM,,Pguess(K, T , P )weight(¯) · result(¯). (6)
We now simplify the tree T¯ by removing every max node from it and simply replacing
it with one of its children which evaluate to the maximum. This new tree is made only of
weighted sum nodes and leaf nodes. Simplify further the tree as follows: remove all the
sums with (outgoing edges with) weights 0 and 1 derived from Dolev–Yao rules other than
the DYGuess rule; replace them with the success subtree (the one reachable through the
edge with weight 1). The resulting tree is thus formed only by weighted sums with weights
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Pguess(, Ti ) and 1− Pguess(, Ti ) and leaves. It has the following form:
We name this tree T and call it the simpliﬁed tree of T¯ . Note that, given t, M, , Pguess,
K, T , and P, the tree T is still equivalent to the old tree, in that it still evaluates to
S tM,,Pguess(K, T , P ). In a similar way to ¯, we write  for the set of every root-to-
leaf simple path of T. Moreover, we extend weight(−), length(−) and result(−) to every
 ∈ .
Again, a simple inductive reasoning shows that the following properties hold:
∀ ∈ . length() t, (7)
∑
∈
weight() = 1, (8)
S tM,,Pguess(K, T , P ) =
∑
 ∈ 
result() = 1
weight(). (9)
In order to prove the theorem, we now study how the tree T¯ corresponding toS 
k
M,,Pguess
(0) changes as  increases. For every , we write T¯  and ¯
 (T  and ) respectively
for the corresponding tree (simpliﬁed tree) and the set of its paths. Also, we write fail
for the path of  that represents the event in which the DYGuess rule always fails.
We denote the labels of the edges of fail by Pguess(, T

i ), therefore weight(

fail) =∏length(fail)
i=0 (1− Pguess(, T i )).
We now claim that the hypothesis implies that, for some , result(fail) is 1. The proof
is by contradiction. Assume result(fail) = 0 for every : we obtain
S
k
M,,Pguess
(0)= ∑
 ∈ 
result() = 1
weight()
= ∑
 ∈  \ {fail}
result() = 1
weight() ∑
∈\{fail}
weight()
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which by (8), yields
S
k
M,,Pguess
(0)1− weight(fail)
= 1−
length(fail)∏
i=0
(
1−Pguess(, T i )
)
1−
(
1−Pguess(, k)
)length(fail)
. (10)
The last inequality derives fromPguess being -negligible and T i k . Applying (7) to T 
yields length(fail)k . Therefore, from (10) we obtain the following asymptotic bound
S
k
M,,Pguess
(0) 1−
(
1− Pguess(, k)
)k
that, by Lemma (2), implies (asymptotically)
S
k
M,,Pguess
(0)1− 3−Pguess(,k)·k . (11)
We now ﬁnd a contradiction by showing that S 
k
M,,Pguess
(0) is negligible. For any c ∈ N,
we show that S 
k
M,,Pguess
(0)−c if  is sufﬁciently large. Since by hypothesis Pguess
is -negligible, we can assume  to be large enough such that Pguess(, k) · k−c−1.
From this and (11) we obtain
S
k
M,,Pguess
(0)1− 3−−c−1 .
Therefore, by Lemma (3), S k
M,,Pguess
(0) is negligible.
Now, having established that result(fail) = 1 for some , we show that P does not
guarantee DY-secrecy, i.e., that for some t, S tM,,P0(0) > 0. We start by lifting the path
fail from the simpliﬁed tree T
 to the non-simpliﬁed tree T¯ , by choosing the path in ¯
leading to the same leaf which fail leads to. We name the path thus obtained ¯

fail.
We now study the tree T¯ which corresponds to S 
k
M,,P0
(0), comparing it to the tree
T¯  which instead corresponds to S 
k
M,,Pguess
(0). A simple inductive reasoning shows that
the two trees are identical except for the labels of the edges. Therefore there is some path
¯ ∈ ¯ which corresponds to ¯fail. As ¯fail, the path ¯ represents the event in which the
DYGuess rule always fails and the other rules always succeed. In T¯ , the weight associated
to the failure of a DYGuess rule is 1−P0(, T i ) = 1− 0 = 1 and the weight associated
to the success of other rules is 1 as well. Therefore, all the labels on the edges of ¯ are equal
to 1 and we have weight(¯) = 1. Moreover, we also have result(¯) = 1 since the path ¯,
as ¯fail, leads to a leaf with a constant 1.
Applying (6) yields
S
k
M,,P0
(0)weight(¯) · result(¯) = 1
thus proving that P does not guarantee the DY-secrecy of M. 
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Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 state that the deﬁnitions ofDYstd-secrecy,DY-secrecy, and
DYP-secrecy are all equivalent. Intuitively, an adversary with unbounded resources, but no
hope of guessing a key, is as powerful as an adversary that might guess a key (with a small
probability) but can only act for a bounded amount of time. This equivalence, however, only
holds asymptotically (with respect to the key length).
5. Authentication
We extend our model to deal with authentication protocols between an initiator and a re-
sponder. To this purpose, we use a non-injective authentication property [23,12]. Informally,
non-injective authentication requires that, whenever the responder completes its protocol,
it must have interacted with the initiator and must agree with the initiator on some set of
values.
Mimicking the Woo–Lam approach [26], we introduce two annotations for when the
initiator starts an authentication run (begin M) and for when the responder completes it
(endM). These take the form of preﬁxes. The syntax of processes becomes the following.
P ::= . . .
| beginM.P authentication start
| endM.P authentication end
Intuitively, the initiator and the responder should agree on the value M.
We also augment the states  of our LTS to include a set of authentication events E .
The generic state  now is (K, T , P , E). The set E records all the actions begin M and
endM the process performs during its execution. Formally, we add the following rules to
our operational semantics:
Begin
(K, T , beginM.P, E) −→(K, T , P , E ∪ {beginM})
,
End
(K, T , endM.P, E) −→(K, T , P , E ∪ {endM})
.
The rules Decl and Par change as follows, because they use the set E . In all the other
rules, the set E is added in the source and target states of transitions, with no change.
Decl
n does not occur in any term of K and of E
(K, T , (new n)P, E) n−→(K, T , P , E)
,
Par
(K, T , P , E) −→(K′, T , P ′, E ′)  =  ∨  /∈ fn(Q)
(K, T , P |Q, E) −→(K′, T , P ′|Q, E ′)
.
As done in the previous section, we write A t,Pguess(K, T , P , E) for the probability the
adversary has to disrupt authentication at a certain step of the computation of P, assuming
that
• the adversary’s initial knowledge is K,
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• the adversary has performed T operations in the previous steps,
• the adversary can guess keys with probability Pguess(),
• the number of transitions is limited by t, and
• the authentication actions performed in the previous steps were recorded in E .
Under the same assumptions we made in Section 4, we deﬁne A t,Pguess(K, T , P , E) as
follows. The deﬁnition is essentially the same as Deﬁnition 2, except for the ﬁrst item below.
It speciﬁes when the adversary succeeds: there is an end M action which is not preceded
by a matching beginM .
Deﬁnition 8. A t,Pguess() is deﬁned by induction on t by the following equations.
A t ()= 1 if ∃M. endM ∈ E ∧ beginM /∈ E, (12)
A 0()= 0, (13)
A t ()=max
({
A t−1(′)
∣∣∣  −→′
}
∪
{
A t (p,N )
∣∣∣  ♠−→p,N
})
, (14)
A t (p,N )=
∑{∣∣∣q ∗A t−1(′)
∣∣∣ p,N ♠s/f−→
q
′
∣∣∣
}
. (15)
As in Deﬁnition 2, the topmost applicable equation is taken. Also, note that -conversion
does not affect the result of the equations above. Indeed, the new name replaces the old one
in all the components of a state, notably in E . Finally, in Eq. (14) the operatormax is applied
to a ﬁnite non-empty set. Thus the probabilityA t,Pguess(K, T , P , E) is well-deﬁned.
5.1. A probabilistic authentication notion
As for secrecy, we can abstract from the parameters t,Pguess,K, T and E . We say that
a protocol P guarantees authentication if any probabilistic polynomially bounded adver-
sary with negligible guessing probability can disrupt authentication only with a negligible
probability. We write 0 for the initial state ({0, 1}, 0, P ,∅).
Deﬁnition 9. We say that a protocol P guaranteesDYP-authentication iff, for any function
Pguess : N×N→ [0, 1],
Pguess is -negligible ⇒ ∀k ∈ N.A 
k
,Pguess
(0) is negligible.
Below, we give the standard deﬁnition of authentication.
Deﬁnition 10. We say that a protocol P guarantees DYstd-authentication iff
∀. (0)−→∗ = (K, T , P ′, E)⇒∃M. endM ∈ E ∧ beginM /∈ E
where the arrow −→ stands for either a −→ transition or a pair ♠−→ ♠s−→ derived from a
deterministic Dolev–Yao rule (i.e., not using a DYGuess).
We can also rephrase the above usingA t,Pguess() as follows.
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Deﬁnition 11. Let P0 be the constant null function. We say that a protocol P guarantees
DY-authentication iff
∀t,  ∈ N.A t,P0(0) = 0.
Of course, the two deﬁnitions above are equivalent.
Proposition 3. P guarantees DYstd-authentication if and only if P guarantees DY-
authentication.
Proof. Easy induction on t and the number of −→ transitions (see Deﬁnition 10). 
We now compare DYstd-authentication and DY-authentication. As for secrecy, also for
authentication the DY adversary is as powerful as the DYP one.
Theorem 2. P guarantees DYP-authentication if and only if P guarantees DY-
authentication.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, and therefore we omit it.
We ﬁnally observe that Theorem 2 and Proposition 3 show the equivalence between
DYstd-authentication, DY-authentication, and DYP-authentication.
6. Non-constant-cost operations
In the deﬁnition of S tM,,Pguess(K, T , P ) the bound t put on the adversary is decreased
by one unit for each application of an entailment rule. So, every operation of the adversary
has a constant cost.
This is an oversimpliﬁcation; a more adequate modeling can be obtained by relating the
amount of resources consumed to the probability of success of the operation involved. For
instance, we could have the following DYGuess rule:
DYGuess {M}n Pguess(,T ,r)−→DYr n (r1).
The quantity r represents the amount of resources the adversary may decide to spend in
guessing. Depending also on the parameter r, Pguess(, T , r) computes a value that ex-
presses the probability of success. The more resources are consumed, the more likely
guessing is; thus we require Pguess(, T , r) to be monotonic on r.
We slightly change the meaning of T , by letting it count the number of resources units
spent by the adversary in the previous steps of the computation, instead of the number of
the operation performed. Note that, if only constant cost operations are considered, the two
notions collapse.
Of course, we consider strong cryptosystems, so we still need to assume that Pguess is
-negligible. The deﬁnition of -negligible function is adapted as follows:
1. ∀T , T ′, r, r ′, . T T ′ ∧ rr ′ ⇒ Pguess(, T , r)Pguess(, T ′, r ′),
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2. ∀c ∈ N. Pguess(, c, c) is negligible.
The second point requires that the guessing probability is negligible provided T and r are
polynomials. Intuitively, if the adversary spent a polynomially bounded amount of resources
in the past (T is a polynomial) and tries to guess spending only a polynomial amount of
resources (r is a polynomial), the probability that guessing succeeds should be negligible.
We also need to adapt the semantics of the adversary actions. We assign r = 1 to
operations other than a DYGuess, and we use the following rules. Note that the parameter
r is not a constant: it may be chosen at run-time by the adversary.
♠Decision1
M ∈ K M p−→DY
r
N
(K, T , P ) ♠−→(K, T , P )r,p,N
,
♠Decision2
L,M ∈ K L,M p−→DY
r
N
(K, T , P ) ♠−→(K, T , P )r,p,N
,
♠Success
(K, T , P )r,p,N ♠s−→
p
(K ∪ {N}, T + r, P )
,
♠Failure
(K, T , P )r,p,N ♠f−→
1−p (K, T + r, P )
.
Note that now T is incremented by r, instead of 1, to count the number of resource units
spent by the adversary in the running computation.
Finally, we change the deﬁnition ofS tM,,Pguess(K, P , E) so that, whenever an entailment
rule requiring r resources is applied, the number t is decreased by r units. Formally, we have
S tM() = 1 ifM −K, (16)
S 0M() = 0, (17)
S tM() = max
({
S t−1M (
′)
∣∣∣  −→′
}
∪
{
S tM(
r,p,N )
∣∣∣  ♠−→r,p,N ∧ r t
})
, (18)
S tM(
r,p,N ) =
∑{∣∣∣q ∗ S t−rM (′)
∣∣∣ r,p,N ♠s/f−→
q
′
∣∣∣
}
. (19)
Note that Eq. (18) considers only the adversary actions that can be actually performed, i.e.,
those with 1r t . This implies that only a ﬁnitely branching fragment of the transition
system is considered. Thus, the max in Eq. (18) is applied to a ﬁnite non-empty set and
therefore S tM,,Pguess() is well-deﬁned.
The deﬁnition of DYP-secrecy needs no changes: it simply uses the new deﬁnition of
-negligible function and the above equations for S tM,,Pguess().
Of course, it is straightforward to change our authentication-related deﬁnitions in a similar
way, thus using this more precise resource accounting also for DYP-authentication.
Our results, notably Theorems 1 and 2, still hold when non-constant cost operations are
added to our model. The proofs change only in a marginal way. Similarly, following the line
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of this section, we could add more parameters to the function Pguess to get an even more
detailed, concrete view of the robustness of the cryptosystem. For instance, we could make
Pguess to increase as the adversary knowledge K becomes larger, i.e., when the adversary
intercepts more messages. We foresee that, provided the deﬁnition of -negligible function
is suitably changed, our results still remain valid.
7. Extensions
Our model can easily be further extended to include other adversary actions and crypto-
graphic primitives. First, we present those extensions that do not signiﬁcatively affect our
results; in particular, it is easy to prove Theorems 1 and 2 also in the model enriched with all
the four extensions below, provided that the probability to break the cryptosystem is kept
negligible.
Private channels
A typical way of specifying secure links is using private channels, as done in the Spi and
the -calculus. Adding private channels to our calculus is straightforward. Extending our
adversary-aware semantics is easy, because terms sent through the private channels do not
affect the knowledge of the adversary K.
Breaking without guessing
In our model we allowed the adversary to guess, i.e., to deduce the key from a given
encryption. We can also give the adversary the ability to break encryptions and get the
plaintext without guessing the key. We can do this by adding the rule
DYBreak {M}n p−→DY M.
As for guessing, we assume of course that p is expressed as some negligible function
Pbreak(). Note that this operation is less powerful than guessing: only the message M is
disclosed with breaking, while guessing reveals bothM and the key. Note however that as-
sumingPbreak negligible is still insufﬁcient to fully guarantee robustness in a computational
sense.
Blind guessing
We could also allow blind guessing, i.e., guessing without using any previous knowledge.
DYBlindGuess
p−→DY n.
This rule differs from DYGuess in that it allows the adversary to guess, e.g., a key that has
not yet been used by the protocol, or a nonce. Therefore, it is strictly more powerful than
the DYGuess rule. Pragmatically, this random guessing operation requires the probability
function to be 2−.
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Other cryptographic primitives
So far, we only considered symmetric encryption. Modeling asymmetric encryption and
digital signatures requires additional rules that explicitly break the cryptosystem beyond
the standard Dolev–Yao rules for asymmetric cryptography. Many different rules can be
used: we just give an example.
We write n+ and n− for public and private keys, respectively. The DYInvert rule below
allows the adversary to compute the private key from the corresponding public key. The
DYFakeSign rule instead allows the adversary to sign a message using only the public key
DYInvert n+ p−→DY n− DYFakeSign M,n+ q−→DY [M]n− .
As above, p and q should be negligible.
We now discuss some deeper extensions that require substantial modiﬁcations to our
model.
Generalizing the security property
Currently, we considered only secrecy and authentication properties. However, we could
extend our results to other security properties as well. In particular, it could be useful
to develop some kind of probabilistic temporal logic in order to do that (see e.g. [15]).
Besides specifying security properties, the logic might help us to better understand the
difference between theDY and theDYPmodels. For example, we can consider any property
 expressed in the logic, and test whether these models are equivalent with respect to that
property, i.e.,
∀P process. (P ) in DY ⇐⇒ (P ) in DYP.
Actually, Sections 4 and 5 establish the above proposition for secrecy and authentication
respectively.
Random choice
Sometimes protocols are speciﬁed using a toss-a-coin operation. In the computational
approach this is easy to model, while the usual non-deterministic operator + of process
calculi is not adequate. A probabilistic choice operator+p (see e.g., Larsen and Skou [16])
accommodates well in our framework, originating transitions on the form −→
p
. The operator
+p could help formalizing security properties that have been faced so far only within the
computational approach, e.g., the correctness of zero-knowledge protocols [13].
Behavioural equivalence
Someauthors advocate the use ofbehavioural equivalence for security properties.Besides
the work mentioned in the Introduction, there are proposals for studying non-interference.
A classical deterministic approach is presented in [12], while a probabilistic version of
non-interference is studied in [21]. All these proposals and those cited in the Introduction
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assume a standard Dolev–Yao adversary. It would be interesting to study if and how these
notions change when a DYP adversary is assumed, instead.
Partial information
In the real world, the adversary may not be able to guess keys but still be able to perform
statistical attacks and gather some partial information from intercepted messages. Unlike
the computational complexity model, ours is not apt to study this kind of attacks. This is
because we use a set to represent the knowledge of the adversary, thus implicitly assuming
that the adversary either has complete knowledge of a term or no knowledge at all. In [11],
Clark et al. deal with information leakage using Shannon’s entropy. Further investigation
is needed to see whether this approach can also be applied to process calculi and formal
methods.
Average-case vs. worst-case analysis
For studying secrecy, in the deﬁnition of S tM,,Pguess(K, T , P ), we only consider the
transition which is the best one for the adversary (i.e., the worst case for P). The same holds
for authentication in the deﬁnition of A t,Pguess(K, T , P , E). Thus, we perform a worst-
case analysis. An alternative would be an average-case analysis: we could consider all the
transitions and weight each of them according to a given distribution. The hard point is to
deﬁne a distribution that faithfully reﬂects both the scheduling of the concurrent actions by
the protocol and the choices the adversary makes among its operations.
8. Conclusions
We presented a simple process calculus that can be used to specify cryptographic pro-
tocols. We introduced two distinct notions of secrecy, one borrowed from formal methods
(DY-secrecy) and one adapted from the computational complexity theory (DYP-secrecy).
Under suitable assumptions, we proved the equivalence of these two secrecy deﬁnitions. A
similar result holds for authentication.
Consequently, the perfect encryption assumption of the formal method approach can be
weakened, as we propose. Thus, one can use standard techniques for protocol analysis (e.g.,
type systems [1], control ﬂow analysis [9,8], model checkers [18,20], etc.) to formally verify
whether a given protocol is DYP-safe. 3
As the reader may have noticed, our proofs only depend on the transition system and are
independent of the calculus and of the deﬁnition of its semantics. Therefore our result can
be easily extended to other calculi, with non-standard operations, and to other properties,
involving differentmeasures of transitions than probability. Indeed, we showed that protocol
3We are speaking loosely here: actually, the problem of deciding whether a given protocol guarantees secrecy
or authentication is undecidable. However, these techniques have been successfully used to verify many protocols
proposed in the literature.
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analysis does not require a full inspection of transition systems: only those paths do sufﬁce,
that can be taken by a Dolev–Yao adversary.
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